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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's 
denial of an injured employees' claim for workers compensation benefits. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1953, as amended), Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-801 
(8) (1997) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Were the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Utah Labor 
Commission complete and legally adequate? 
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review which is to be applied 
to the resolution of all of the above issue is "correction of error" since it involves a 
questions of law and no deference to the agency's view of the law is required, 
because the appellate court has the power and duty to say what the law is and to 
ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Drake v. Industrial Commission. 
939 P.2d 177,182 (Utah 1997). Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Annotated, § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review. 817 
P.2d 328 (Utah 1991). Morton International. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Issue 2: Did the Utah Labor Commission committed error by adopting a 
Medical Panel report which was incomplete, factually erroneous and which failed to 
consider all of the medical evidence relating to Petitioner's cervical and lumbar 
l 
injuries and further by adopting the Medical Panel Report without making an 
independent evaluation of the facts and evidence. 
Standard of Review for Issue 2: This is a mixed question of law and fact to 
which this Court extends "heightened deference" to the Commission's determination 
"with varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review of 
'correctness and a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." Drake v. Industrial 
Commission. 939 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally 
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the 
Petitioner, e.g., State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 
1053 (Utah 1984); and McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 
1977). 
Preservation for appeal. All of the above issues were raised by Petitioner 
before the Utah Labor Commission. A Petition for Review was timely filed with this 
Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 34A-2-401. (1953 as amended), is the 
applicable Statue and provides as follows: 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and 
the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident 
arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, 
wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-
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inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses. 
****************** 
The complete Statute is attached hereto in Addendum "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: The Petitioner, Douglas J. Owens, seeks review of the 
Utah Labor Commission's denial of his claim for medical expenses, permanent 
partial disability compensation, permanent total disability compensation and future 
medical expenses for injuries to his upper and lower back, arising out of and in the 
course of his employment with Respondent, Beckstrom Body Shop. 
Course of Proceedings: Mr. Owens filed an Application for Hearing for 
workers' compensation benefits on account of an April 3,1998 injury to his back and 
arms incurred in the course and scope of his employment with the Respondent 
Beckstrom Body Shop. (R1 at 1). The Employer and it's workers compensation 
Carrier filed a Response, in letter form, on April 4, 2002. (R1 at 10-11). Notice of 
Formal Hearing was sent to all parties on April 25, 2002, setting Mr. Owens' claim 
for Hearing on September 26,2002. (R1 at 12). Petitioner's deposition was taken 
on July 15,2002. (R2at178). 
Following the Hearing, Administrative Law Judge Stuart L. Poelman directed 
each of the parties to submit Proposed Findings of Fact and Questions for the 
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Medical Panel. The Respondents submitted their Proposed Findings of Fact on 
October 18,2002. (R1 at 31-35). The Petitioner reviewed those Proposed Findings 
and requested certain revisions as well as an additional Question for the Medical 
Panel on November 14, 2002. (R1 at 36-40). At that same time, Petitioner also 
submitted the October 26,2002 Medical Report of Orthopaedic Surgeon Charles P. 
Bean, which had not been received in time for inclusion in the Medical Records 
Exhibit. (R1 at 41-42). 
On November 21, 2002, the Administrate Law Judge issued his Preliminary 
Findings of Fact and Questions for the Medical Panel, incorporating both of the 
parties proposals. (R1 at 44-48). A signed copy of said Preliminary Findings of Fact 
and Questions for the Medical Panel is attached hereto as Addendum "B". 
On December 12,2002, the Administrative Law Judge appointed Dr. Madison 
Thomas, a neurologist as Chair of the Medical Panel"... to conduct an impartial 
evaluation of the medical aspects of this case." The Panel was provided with the 
pleadings, the Administrative Law Judges Preliminary Findings of Fact and 
Questions for Medical Panel, the Medical Exhibit as supplemented at the Hearing, 
the Medical Report of Dr. Charles P. Bean, as well as the Radiographs. Dr. Thomas 
was given permission to"... associate other medical specialists of [his] choice to 
assist [him] in [his] evaluation as [he] deemed necessary" and was instructed to"... 
conduct a personal physical examination of the Petitioner" and then answer the 
questions posed in the Preliminary Findings of Fact and Questions for Medical 
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Panel. (R1 at 49-50). 
On December 30,2002 the Panel issued it's Report finding that there was no 
causal connection between the Petitioner's cervical condition and the industrial 
accident of April 3,1998, that he had no permanent partial impairment attributed to 
the cervical condition and that he did not require medical care for his back 
subsequent to September 1999. (R1 at 52-67). 
On April 9, 2003 the Medical Panel Report was provided to the parties and 
they were given 15 days from that date to file objections, if any. (R1 at 68). On April 
23, 2003 Petitioner filed Objections to Findings and Conclusions of the Medical 
Panel pointing out many factual errors and misinterpretations by the Medical Panel. 
(R1 at 69-82). The Respondents did not file their own Objections to the Medical 
Panel Report, but on May 6,2003 filed a Response to the Applicant's Objections to 
the Medical Panel Report, despite the fact that responses to a parties objections was 
not requested by the Administration Law Judge in his April 9, 2003 Order, not is it 
provided for in the Administrative Rules of the Labor Commission. (R1 at 94-108). 
No Hearing was held on Petitioner's detailed Objections to the Medical Panel 
Report. 
On May 27, 2003, Administrative Law Judge Stuart L. Poelman entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Without reference to the 
Petitioner's detailed Objections, the ALJ adopted his prior Preliminary Findings of 
Fact and the conclusions of the Medical Panel as his own, denied any additional 
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medial care or permanent partial impairment rating for Petitioner's cervical and low 
back conditions. (R1 at 109-111). 
Petitioner filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission on July 
7, 2003 alleging numerous errors in fact finding and legal analysis in the ALJ's 
decision, based largely on his total reliance and deference to a flawed Medical Panel 
Report. (R1 at 115-124). Accompanying that Motion was a June 2,2003 Medical 
Report from Dr. Blake Welling specifically responding to the Medical Panel Report. 
(R1 at 127). Dr. Welling's rebuttal report was not received priorto the Administrative 
Law Judge's decision, but no objection to its delayed filing was made by the 
Respondent Employer/Carrier. The Respondent Employer/Carrier did file a 
Response to the Applicant's Motion for Review dated May 6,2003, although it was 
not date stamped as received by the Labor Commission until July 22,2003. (R1 at 
129-153). It did not object to the delayed submission of Dr. Welling's Report 
although they noted that it was written forty days after Petitioner his Objections to the 
Medical Panel report and six days after the ALJ had issued his Order. (R1 at 130). 
On November 4,2003, the Utah Labor Commission entered an Order Denying 
Motion for Review. (R1 at 157-161). A signed copy of said Order is attached hereto 
in Addendum "C". A Request for Reconsideration was filed on November 24,2003 
by Petitioner. (R1 at 162-165). An Order Denying Request for Reconsideration was 
entered by the Utah Labor Commission on January 6, 2004. (R1 at 175-176). A 
signed copy of said Order is attached hereto in Addendum "D". 
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A Petition for Review was timely filed with this Court on February 4, 2004. 
Statement of Facts: The facts and circumstances surrounding Mr. Owens' 
industrial injury are not in dispute. As the Utah Labor Commission noted in it's Order 
Denying Motion for Review "Neither Mr. Owens nor Beckstrom disagree with Judge 
Poelman's account of Mr. Owens' accident at Beckstrom and the events that 
followed the accident. The Commission adopts Judge Poelman's findings..." (R1 at 
157, see also Addendum "B"). 
In the interest of clarity, the relevant facts are summarized as follows: 
On April 3 1998, M. Owens and a co-worker were replacing the front end 
suspension on a car. Mr. Owens was using a long steel pry-bar in an effort to 
remove an axle nut. He was standing partially bent at the waist with his right hand 
on the car window frame so as to steady himself and using his left hand to pull 
upward on the bar. While pulling with considerable effort, the axle nut snapped and 
he felt a popping sensation in his left wrist and elbow. He also felt a shock that 
traveled through his entire body. (R1 at 44, ALJ Finding #1) 
On April 13, 1998, Mr. Owens was seen at the IHC Health Center in North 
Ogden for pain in his left elbow. He was diagnosed with epicondylitis. (R1 at 44, 
ALJ Finding #2). 
Approximately two to four weeks later, Mr. Owens, back at work for 
Respondent Beckstrom picked up a 3 pound sledge hammer to beat the rolls out of 
a frame rail. Upon raising the hammer with his right hand to a position above his 
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head, and prior to striking the rail, Mr. Owens felt a sharp pain in his right elbow and 
his elbow then "gave way." (R1 at 44, ALJ Finding #3). 
He was seen on June 2,1998 at South Ogden IHC Instacare for evaluation of 
right elbow pain and subsequently underwent a right tennis elbow release, release 
of ulnar nerve in Guyon's canal and a left tennis elbow release and Guyon's canal 
release. The surgery did not relieve Petitioner's left arm symptoms nor did they do 
anything for his cervical and lumbar spine conditions. (R1 at 44, ALJ Findings #3,4, 
5, and 6). 
In January through April, 2001 Mr. Owens was seen at the Ogden Clinic for 
multiple complaints of cervical and lumbar spine pain. A cervical MRI performed on 
April 23, 2001 showed a C3-4 herniated disc with Myelomalcia. (R1 at 46, ALJ 
Finding #16 and 17). On April 24,2001, Dr. Welling performed a partial C3 and C4 
corpectomy with anterior cervical diskectomy and osteophytectomy and 
foraminotomy, arthrodesis C3-C4 and allograft fusion. (R1 at 46, ALJ Finding #18). 
Respondents accepted liability for and paid workers compensation benefits 
in relation to Petitioner's left and right elbow problems, but denied any and all liability 
for Petitioner's medical problems in relation to his neck and back. (R1 at 45, ALJ 
Finding #8). 
The case was submitted to a Medical Panel to determine the causal 
connection between Mr. Owens' cervical condition and his industrial accident of April 
3,1998. (R1 at 47). The Medical Panel summarily concluded that; 
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1) There is no casual connection between the petitioner's 
cervical condition and the industrial accident of 3 April 
1998. 
2) The medical care the petitioner received subsequent to 
September 1999 has not been necessitated by the 
industrial accident of 3 April 1998. 
3) Future medical care reasonably required as a result of the 
industrial injury of 3 April 1998 is none. 
4) Permanent partial impairment rating attributable to the 
cervical conditions caused by the industrial accident of 3 
April 1998 is none. (Medical Panel Report, R1 at 57). 
The Panel further opined that: 
General Comment: It is the panel's experience that an acute disc 
herniation is almost never devoid of any pain at the time of an impact. 
There is an excessive long interval before any valid reports of the 
cervical symptoms occurred, with this time being quite reasonably 
taken up by attention to his upper extremity symptoms, which were 
reasonably directed, and we understand have been accepted as 
appropriate to the event in question. (Medical Panel Report, R1 at 
57page 6). 
Petitioner filed a lengthy Objection to Findings and Conclusions of the Medical 
Panel. Petitioner noted that the Medical Panel Report was rife with errors from 
misstating Petitioner's age by 10 years, to various misstatements of Petitioner's 
complaints and testimony. Exceptions were taken to the Panel's Report regarding 
their examination pointing out factual errors and well as errors in medical 
interpretation. These Objections also included a detailed response by Dr. Blake 
Welling, a Neurosurgeon and Mr. Owens treating physician for his cervical and 
lumbar problems as well as medical literature on the relevant issues. (R1 at 69-93). 
No Hearing was held on the Petitioner's Objections to Findings and 
Conclusions of the Medical Panel and although the Administrative Law Judge noted 
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that Objections and Responses were filed by the parties, no analysis of those 
arguments are made in the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
(R1 at 110). The Administrative Law Judge without comment or analysis simple 
adopts the conclusions of the Medical Panel and finds "...no causal connection 
between Petitioner's cervical condition and the industrial accident of 4/3/98." (R1 at 
110). 
A Motion for Review was filed with the Utah Labor Commission which rather 
summarily concluded that he had not establish medical causation and thus the 
Commission "...concludes that his injury did not arise out of his employment and is 
not compensable under the workers' compensation system." (R1 at 160, see also 
Addendum "C"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case contains a shocking example of failure to resolve doubt in favor of 
a injured worker. On each and every issue on which there is substantial doubt due 
to conflicting evidence, the Utah Labor Commission resolves that doubt in favor of 
the Respondent insurance carrier and denies compensation. Although the Findings 
of Fact surrounding the occurrence of the injury and the course of treatment were 
stipulated to by the parties, there was a sharp disagreement as to the Medical 
Panels findings and conclusions. The Utah Labor Commission adopted the Medical 
Panel Report over detailed objections with no real analysis of the Report or the 
Petitioner's objections. The Medical Panel Report as adopted by the Utah Labor 
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Commission was rife with uncorrected errors rendering the Order Denying Motion 
for Review as flawed, arbitrary and capricious. 
A R G U M E N T 
I 
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY 
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER. 
Few principles of workers compensation law are as well established in this 
State as that workers' compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed 
in favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be 
resolved in favor of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this principle 
from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); 
J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. 
Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission. 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d 
613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M& 
K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, discussed the proper 
construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the underlying purposes of the 
Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that the statues 
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of this state are to be 'liberally construed with a view to effect the 
objects of the statutes and to promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the compensation 
provided for in the act is in no sense to be considered as damages for 
the injured employee or to his dependents in case death supervenes. 
The right to compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of [or] in the 
course of the employment. Under such an act the costs and expenses 
of conducting the business or enterprise, including compensation for 
injuries to 'employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the whole cost 
and expense of conducting the business as aforesaid is added to the 
cost of the articles that are produced and sold, and hence, in the long 
run, such costs and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such an act, 
therefore, is to protect the employee and those dependent upon him, 
and in case of his serious injury or death to provide adequate means for 
the support of those dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in 
case of total disability or death of the employee his dependents might 
become the objects of public charity, such a calamity is avoided by 
requiring the business or enterprise to provide for such dependents, 
with the right of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such business or enterprise. 
The beneficent purpose of such acts are therefore apparent to all, and 
for that reason, if for no other, should receive a very liberal construction 
in favor of the injured employee. We are all united upon the proposition 
that in view of the purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the employee or his dependents as the case may be. id. at 
1021-1022. (Emphasis added) 
Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the record, it must be resolved 
in favor of the injured worker and the awarding of benefits. The Utah Labor 
Commission and even the Administrative Law Judge, however, failed to properly 
apply this vital rule of construction. The Order Denying Motion for Review does not 
evidence a "liberal construction" and "resolution of doubt in favor of the claim." 
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Rather, when there is any doubt in the record, particularly as to Mr. Owens' injuries, 
they construe those facts and the inferences from them against him. A fair reading 
of the medical evidence indicates that Mr. Owens' April 3, 1998 industrial injury 
medically caused his cervical spine injury. 
II 
THE UTAH LABOR COMMISSION'S FAILED TO ENGAGE IN 
LEGALLY COMPLETE AND ADEQUATE FACT FINDING AND THUS 
IT'S ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW WAS ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Although the Labor Commission "accepted and adopted Judge Poelman's 
Findings, the Commission only finds that the ALJ's findings are supported by the 
Medical Panel Report and that they "accept and adopf his decision denying 
compensation. 
The Commission does not make even the most cursory review of the 
applicable facts. It provides no analysis or fact finding as to how it reached the 
conclusion that the Medical Panel Report was the "most persuasive evidence 
regarding the medical aspects of Ms. Cunningham's claim." (R1 at 74). Although 
the Commission may well have wanted to affirm the ALJ's decision, it can not 
"accept and adopt" the ALJ's decision as its own without engaging in fact finding. 
In Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330,335 (Utah App. 1990), cert. 
denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals has previously 
informed the Labor Commission that: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the 
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commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factually issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran. 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336 
(Utah 1979))... [T]he failure of an agency to make adequate findings of 
fact on material issues renders its findings 'arbitrary and capricious' 
unless the evidence is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one 
conclusion.' Jd. (Quoting Kinkella v. Bauah. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 
1983)). 
In Milne Truck Lines. Inc. v. Public Service Commission. 720 P.2d 1373,1378 
(Utah 1986) the Utah Supreme Court clearly articulated the proper standard 
regarding findings of fact in Orders from Administrative Agencies like the Utah Labor 
Commission: 
The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent 
findings of fact is essential to a proper determination by an 
administrative agency. To that end, findings should be 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact 
and law, are reached Without such findings, this Court 
cannot . . . [protect] the parties and the public from 
arbitrary and capricious administrative action. 
Additionally, findings of fact are only adequate when they are supported by 
"substantial evidence" viewed by the record as a whole. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(g). In applying the substantial evidence test, the Court must review the whole 
record including, "not only the evidence supporting the board's factual findings, but 
also the evidence that fairly detracts from the weight of the board's evidence." 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
(Emphasis added). 
Furthermore, while the Commission does adopt the Findings of the Medical 
Panel it does so without the slightest rational as to why it finds the Panel Report to 
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be "most persuasive evidence regarding the medical aspects of Ms. Cunningham's 
clam." The Industrial Commission may not grant a Medical Panel opinion a 
presumption of correctness, but rather must always weigh conflicting medical 
evidence in light of materiality, credibility and competency, etc. without a 
preconceived deference to either side. Olsen v. Industrial Commission.. 776 P.2d 
937, 67 and 68 f.n. 2 (Utah App. 1989). See Rushton v. Gelco Express. 732 P.2d 
109,111-12 (Utah 1986). 
Ill 
THE UTAH LABOR COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR BY 
ADOPTING A MEDICAL PANEL REPORT WHICH WAS 
INCOMPLETE. FACTUALLY ERRONEOUS AND WHICH FAILED TO 
CONSIDER ALL OF THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
PETITIONER'S CERVICAL AND LUMBAR INJURIES AND FURTHER 
BY ADOPTING THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT WITHOUT MAKING 
AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE. 
Petitioner's Motion for Review, filed with the Utah Labor Commission listed 
several separate and independent objections and cited errors in the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge. Despite the fact that those objections and errors where 
clearly cited and supported with analysis, the Utah Labor Commission cites them but 
summarily dismissed them without any analysis. Failure to address all of the issues 
below constitutes inadequate fact finding and adjudicative process and warrants 
reversal and/or remand to the Commission for proper disposition. 
Although the parties did not object to the Preliminary Findings of Fact and 
Questions for the Medical Panel, substantial objections were raised to the Medical 
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Panel Report. Those will not set forth in detail here, as Petitioner's Objections to 
Findings of Conclusions of Medical Panel is incorporated, in full, by reference herein. 
(R1 at 69-93). 
For the purpose of illustration and not limitation, the Panel report was full of 
errors, including incorrectly stating Petitioner's age (making him ten years older and 
naturally more suspectable to neck and back pain), incorrectly finding that Petitioner 
had reported symptoms of clonic movements prior to April 1, 1998, incorrectly 
reporting the nature and extent of his physical injuries, symptoms and treatment, and 
even incorrectly reporting Petitioners performance at the examination. 
Most glaring was the scant attention that the Medical Panel devoted to 
Petitioner's cervical and lumbar back problems. This was the sole and exclusive 
issue which was submitted to the Medical Panel and yet it is treated as though it was 
a side issue of no real significance. The Panel only reports that: "Following a 
cervical MRI, on 24 April 2001, Dr. Welling did a partial C3 and C4 corpectomy with 
anterior cervical diskectomy, with osteophytectomy and foraminotomy, with 
arthrodesis of C3-4 and an allograft fusion." (R1 at 54). 
No mention is made of Mr. Owens' numerous visits at the Ogden Clinic in 
January, March and April of 2001 for neck and low back pain. Completely omitted 
is any reference or analysis to the MRI performed on April 23,2001, which showed 
a herniated disc at C3-4 with Myelomalcia. The Panel makes a summary 
Conclusion that there is no causal connection between Mr. Owens admitted 
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industrial injury and his neck problems, but does not include any analysis or findings 
as to how they reached that conclusion. 
Dr. Welling's report of December 10,2001 (r3 at 143) was contained in the 
Medical Exhibit which was available to the Panel. That report clearly states: 
This (chronic cervical myelopathy) was evidenced by an MRI scan 
which demonstrated a profound large disk herniation somewhat 
calcified at the level of C3-4 with significant longstanding long term 
evidence of spinal cord pressure with myelomalacia and intramedullary 
edema of the cervical spine cord... It is my neurosurgical opinion that 
his neck pain was totally related to his work injury of question, that 
being April 1998. The reasons I feel this way are because of the long 
term edematous changes on his spinal cord noted on his MRI scan, and 
fact that this was a calcified disk seen intraoperatively, and the fact that 
he had these paresthesias with essentially a failure to diagnose 
because of his longstanding paresthesias, weakness, etc. I do believe 
this was a trauma related because it is extremely rare to see a high 
cervical disk herniation in such a young patient other than in atraumatic 
situation. I believe, after reviewing with the patient, that his mechanism 
of injury was sufficient enough to produce this type of disk herniation 
seen. (Emphasis added). 
The Medical Panel makes no reference to the reports, findings and 
conclusions of Dr. Welling, the treating, board certified neurosurgeon, even though 
they are in stark opposition to the conclusions the Medical Panel reaches. There is 
no indication in the Medical Panel Report that they were even aware of Dr. Welling's 
expert medical opinion. This is especially grevious since the Utah Labor 
Commission itself noted that "The Commission acknowledges that Dr. Welling, as 
Mr. Owens' surgeon, has direct knowledge regarding Mr. Owens' cervical condition. 
The Commission therefore places substantial weight on Dr. Welling's opinion." (R1 
at 159, see also Order Denying Motion for Review, Addendum "C" hereto). 
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If the Panel makes any consideration of the casual connection of Mr. Owens 
herniated cervical disk it is to dismiss it because: 
It is the panel's experience that an acute disc herniation is almost never 
devoid of any pain at the time of an impact. There is an excessive long 
interval before any valid reports of the cervical symptoms occurred, 
with this time being quite reasonably taken up by attention to his upper 
extremity symptoms, which were reasonably directed, and we 
understand have been accepted as appropriate to the event in question. 
(Medical Panel Report, page 6). 
The error in this analysis is that Mr. Owens did have cervical and lumbar pain 
at the time of his acknowledged April 3,1998 industrial injury. Indeed the Medical 
Panel was instructed by the Administrative Law Judge that immediately following the 
industrial injury that Mr. Owens"... felt a popping sensation in his left wrist and a 
shocking sensation throughout his body." (Preliminary Findings of Fact and 
Question for the Medical Panel, No. 1). 
Further, Dr. Welling reviewed the Medical Panel report and provided a 
detailed response on this critical issue. In a June 2,2003 supplementary report (R1 
at 127), Dr. Welling stated in pertinent part as follows: 
I am writing this letter to refute the opinions of the medical board sitting 
(sic) that 'an acute disk injury is almost never devoid of any pain at the 
time of impact.' This certainly is true in terms of dealing with cervical 
radicular symptoms. However, in Mr. Doug Owens' case, we are not 
dealing with cervical radicular symptoms, but more rather spinal cord 
compression with myelopathy with is very commonly devoid of any pain 
at the time of injury. This operation was not done for nerve root or 
radicular decompression, but more rather was an urgent 
decompression of the spinal cord. It is commonly seen in my practice 
as well as medical literature that spinal cord compromise and pressure 
is relatively painless other than progressive motor and sensory 
weakness which this patient exhibited. As such. I strongly disagree 
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with the medical panel stating that this was not a Workman's 
Compensation injury. I would support that this was indeed a workman's 
Comp injury because of his progressive myelopathy and not from anv 
nerve root entrapment. (Emphasis added). 
This report by Dr. Welling is very compelling as it points out the fundamental 
error in the Medical Panel Report. The Panels emphasis on the lack of pain at the 
time of injury is misplaced because that is only expected with cervical radicular 
injuries. Mr. Owens, however, had a spinal cord compression with myelopathy 
"which is very commonly devoid of any pain at the time of injury." Neither the 
Medical Panel or the Utah Labor Commission evidently did not realize or fully 
appreciate that the operation was not done for nerve root or radicular decompression 
but rather an urgent decompression of the spinal cord. 
In short, the Medical Panel Report in this case is full of errors both factually 
and medically. The most serious error is their central contention that Mr. Owens 
cervical problems could not be related to his industrial injury due to the lack of 
immediate pain in that area. That contention is fully addressed by Dr. Welling and 
shown to be based on an incorrect assumption that he was suffering from cervical 
radicular symptoms rather than a spinal cord compression. 
The Utah Labor Commission adopts the ALJ's Preliminary Findings of Fact 
and Questions for the Medical Panel. The Petitioner did not object to those 
Findings, as far as they go. The Utah Labor Commission however goes on to adopt 
the conclusions of the Medical Panel in whole without weighing the conflicting 
medical evidence. The Utah Labor Commission's Findings, Conclusions and Order 
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are devoid of independent fact finding on the medical issues nor do the Conclusions 
reached show any weighing of the conflicting evidence. 
It is well established that the Industrial Commission must weigh all of the 
evidence in a given case and may not simply defer to a Medical Panel absent good 
reason. Olsen v. Industrial Commission. 797 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1990). The 
Administrative Law Judge does not even address the Objections to the Medical 
Panel Report or weigh and consider the reports of Dr. Welling which refute the 
conclusions of the Panel on the only issue in question. Nor is the submitted medical 
literature evaluated and weighed even though it goes to the central issue in this 
case. It is plain error to give deference to a Medical Panel Report by adopting it as 
dispositive of the medical issues without addressing conflicting evidence. See, 
Olsen ibid. 
Indeed, the Utah Courts on several occasions have made it clear that the 
Industrial Commission may not grant a Medical Panel opinion a presumption of 
correctness, but rather must always weigh conflicting medical evidence in light of 
materiality, credibility and competency, etc. without a preconceived deference to 
either side. Olsen v. Industrial Commission. 776 P.2d 937, 67 and 68 f.n. 2 (Utah 
App. 1989). See also, Rushton v. Gelco Express. 732 P.2d 109, 111-12 (Utah 
1986). 
It is impossible to determine how the Utah Labor Commission reached the 
result he did other than by blindly adopting the Medical Panel Report in whole and 
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ignoring competent, well reasoned conflicting medical reports. This is even more 
glaring given the complete absence of any reference to the Objections to the Medical 
Panel Report which were filed. No hearing was held on the Objections. Dr. Welling's 
June 2, 2003 supplementary report was not even referred to nor submitted to the 
Medical Panel for their reconsideration. There is simply no evidence in the record 
that the Administrative Law Judge nor the Utah Labor Commission was even aware 
of, nor considered the Objections to the Medical Panel Report and Dr. Welling's 
detailed Report showing the fundamental error in the Medical Panel's conclusions. 
Nor is the submitted medical literature evaluated and weighed. The Commission 
dismisses that medical evidence as "... materials extracted from the internet. 
Without proper foundation such materials cant be received as authoritative." (R1 at 
159). No analysis is provided for the claimed "foundation" problem. Hearsay 
evidence is specifically allowed in Workers' Compensation matters. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Utah Labor 
Commission in it's Order Denying Motion for Review (Addendum "C") are deficient 
in fact finding, analysis and weighing of the evidence in this case. The total and 
blind deference given to the Medical Panel Report is plain error, given the failure to 
consider, weigh and evaluate the conflicting medical reports, evidence, testimony 
and medical literature. There is certainly no evidence of the weighing of the 
conflicting evidence by the Commission as required by Olsen and Rushton. Ibid. 
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CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
In conclusion, the Order Denying Motion for Review is so shockingly deficient 
in fact finding and analysis that it can not be sustained by this Court. There is simply 
no evidentiary basis upon which this Court can discern the steps by which the 
ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, were reached. 
This defect makes the Order arbitrary and capricious and it must be reversed and 
remanded to the Commission for adequate fact finding and analysis. 
Further the Order failed to address fundamental flaws in the Medical Panel 
Report and the Administrative Law Judges decision particularly in regards to medical 
causation on the back issues. 
Petitioner respectfully requests that the final agency action in Mr. Owen's case 
be reversed, and that his claim be remanded to the Commission for the purpose of 
engaging in actual and detailed factfinding and that this Court offer the Commission 
guidance on the other points of law as indicated above. 
DATED this jhh day of June, 2004 -jfUlDXL 
MICHAEL GARY BELIM 
Counsel for Petitioner / 
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Addendum A 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 34A-2-401 (1953 as amended) 
34A-2-401. COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS TO BE PAID. 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of 
and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
(Hi) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, 
and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, shall commence within 30 calendar days after 
any final award by the commission. 
Addendum B 
Preliminary Findings of Fact and Questions for the Medical Panel 
Administrative Law Judge Stuart L. Poelman 
November 21, 2002 
Utah Labor Commission 
Adjudication Division 
Case No. 2002214 
DOUGLAS J. OWENS, 
Petitioner, * PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF FACT 
vs. * AND QUESTIONS FOR THE 
MEDICAL PANEL 
BECKSTROM BODY SHOP, and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND * Judge Stuart L. Poelman 
Respondents. * 
* 
* 
FACTS 
1. On April 3,1998, Petitioner (Owens) and a co-worker were replacing the front 
end suspension on a car. Owens was using a long steel pry bar in an effort to remove 
an axle nut. He was standing partially bent at the waist with his right hand on the car 
window frame so as to steady himself and using his left hand to pull upward on the bar. 
While pulling with considerable effort the axle nut snapped and he felt a popping 
sensation in his left wrist and a shocking sensation throughout his body. 
2. On April 13,1998, Owens was seen at the IHC Health Center in North Ogden for 
pain in his left elbow. He was diagnosed with epicondylitis. 
3. Approximately two to four weeks later, Owens picked up a 3 pound sledge 
hammer to beat the rolls out of a frame rail. Upon raising the hammer with his right 
hand to a position above his head, prior to striking the rail, Owens felt a sharp pain in 
his right elbow. He was then seen on June 2,1998 at South Ogden IHC Instacare for 
evaluation of right elbow pain (MRE, Medical Records Exhibit, p.57) 
4. On September 30,1998 Dr. Melville performed a nerve conduction test. His 
impression was mild compression neuropathy of both ulnar nerves at the wrist (Guyon's 
canal) was present bilaterally. There was no evidence of axonal degeneration 
associated with this. There was no electro diagnostic evidence of median neuropathy 
at the wrist nor an ulnar neuropathy at the elbow of either arm. (MRE p. 131-132). 
5. On October 21,1998, Dr. Higgs performed a right tennis elbow release and release 
of ulnar nerve in Guyon's canal. (MRE p. 252). 
6. On February 1,1999, Dr. Higgs performed a left tennis elbow release and Guyon's 
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canal release. (MRE p. 250). Mr. Owens was off work following this surgery from 
February 1,1999 to March 14,1999. The surgery did not relieve Owen's left arm 
symptoms. (MRE p. 196,197, 201). 
7. Dr. Shepard evaluated Owens on September 9,1999. Dr. Shepard opined that 
Owens qualified for a total 7% upper extremity impairment rating for the residual 
symptoms in his right and left elbows. (MRE p. 186). 
8. Respondents have accepted liability for Owen's injuries to his left and right elbows 
and have paid medical expenses, temporary total disability compensation and 
permanent partial impairment compensation for those injuries. On the other hand, 
Respondent's deny liability for Owen's claims relative to his cervical and lumbar spine 
conditions. 
9. On November 19, 1999, Owens left his employment with Beckstrom Body Shop at 
which time he had been given a 50-pound lifting restriction as a result of injuries to his 
right and left elbows. At that time he was able to stoop, bend at the waist, carry items, 
stand and sit. 
10. In December of 1999, Owen's was hired full-time at Young Chevrolet as a service 
writer. His job duties required him to write up the service orders and follow the job until 
delivery to the customer. One week after beginning his employment with Young 
Chevrolet, Owens fell down 2 steps at his home. Owens sought medical attention on 
December 19,1999 at IHC Health Center-North Ogden for low back pain. (MRE p. 46). 
Owens missed approximately 1 week of work with Young Chevrolet due to his low back 
symptoms. 
11. Shortly thereafter, Owens tripped over his dog and fell down 8-10 stairs landing on 
his buttocks. Owens hit his head on the stairs. Owens sought medical attention on 
January 11, 2000 at IHC Health Center-North Ogden. (MRE p. 42). 
12. Owens was referred to Dr. Anden and was seen on January 21, 2000 for an initial 
consultation with a chief complaint of low back pain. He reported problems with 
walking, dragging his left leg, pain, numbness and tingling in both legs (MRE p. 
170,172,176,177-80). He received several injections and followed up with Dr. Anden 
through August 1, 2000. 
13. Owens was employed as a shop manager for Hadley Brothers from May 2000 to 
April 20, 2001. Hadley Brothers is an industrial paint company. Owen's job duties 
included checking out various painting materials including paint equipment, rollers, 
brushes, sandpaper, poles, ladders, and gallon paint cans (estimated weight at 10-15 
lbs.). The ladders ranged from 2 ft. step ladders to 30 ft. extension ladders. The 
largest ladders Owens handled by himself were the 8 ft. aluminum ladders. Owen was 
also responsible for cleaning and repairing the equipment. The equipment consisted of 
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palm sanders, paint guns, paint machines (19 inches tall, 36-40 inches wide) pressure 
washers (30-48 inches tall, 2 feet wide) and compressors (30 gallons). He also 
coordinated repair/service on the fleet vehicles. 
14. While employed with Hadley Brothers, Owens was working on an airless paint 
sprayer. He was sitting on the floor using a pipe wrench to remove a nut. The nut was 
difficult to remove and when it gave way, Owens experienced an increase in pain and 
numbness in his left elbow. He sought medical attention at Workmed on October 17, 
2000. (MRE p. 165). 
15. Owens followed up with Dr. Morgan on November 6, 2000 as a result of the reinjury 
to his left elbow. (MRE p. 157). An injection was performed and a prescription was 
given for a custom plastic built up orthosis of the left elbow. Following the 
manufacturing of this brace, Owens was seen again by Dr. Morgan on March 16, 2001. 
Dr. Morgan noted that the brace was medically necessary and that Owens reported that 
he was able to work his usual job with no restrictions. (MRE p. 154). 
16. In January, March, and April of 2001, Owens was seen at the Ogden Clinic for 
multiple complaints of pain, etc. (MRE p. 93). On April 6,2001, Owens was seen at 
Ogden Clinic for low back pain. A bone scan was performed on April 13, 2001 which 
showed no significant abnormalities. (MRE p. 218). 
17. Owens returned to the Ogden Clinic on April 17, 2001 complaining of worsening 
low back and leg pain. A repeat MRI was recommended. (MRE pg. 91). Owens was 
seen in the McKay Dee Hospital emergency room on April 22, 2001 for numbness and 
stiffness in his extremities. An MRI of the head and neck was scheduled for May 1, 
2001. (MRE p.243-244). Owens returned to the emergency room on April 23, 2001. A 
cervical MRI was performed evidencing a C3-4 herniated disc with Myelomalcia. 
18. On April 24, 2001, Dr. Welling performed a partial C3 and C4 corpectomy with 
anterior cervical diskectomy with osteophytectomy and foraminotomy, arthrodesis C3-
C4, and allograft fusion. (MRE p. 239). 
19. Owens testified at the hearing that he has continuous spasms and shakiness in his 
legs. He still experiences pain and numbness in both legs, however, the numbness in 
the right leg is greater that the left. Owens walks with the assistance of a cane and has 
been directed to discontinue driving automobiles. It has been recommended that he 
not lift greater than 10 pounds. Owens can sit for fifteen minutes to one-half hour and 
can stand ten-fifteen minutes. 
20. At age 17 Owens was involved in a motorcycle accident sustaining an injury to his 
low back. Since this accident, Owens has experienced low back pain in the tailbone 
area and numbness in the right anterolateral thigh. 
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21. Owens requests payment of medical expenses associated with his cervical 
condition and permanent and total disability benefits. Owens relies upon Dr. Welling's 
opinion set forth on MRE p. 143 which states that Owens' neck pain is related to his 
work injury of April of 1998. Respondents deny that Mr. Owens' neck condition and 
subsequent diagnosis of cervical myelopathy are related to his work injury based on the 
opinion of Dr. Curtis' set forth on MRE p. 12 G. Respondents furthermore denied that 
Owens is entitled to an award of permanent total disability benefits asserting that if 
Owens is indeed unable to work it is due to his nonindustrial cervical condition. 
QUESTIONS FOR THE MEDICAL PANEL 
1. What is the causal connection, if any, between Owens cervical condition and his 
industrial accident of April 3,1998 while employed by Beckstrom Body Shop? 
2. What medical care which Owens has received since September of 1999, if any, has 
been necessitated by his industrial accident of April 3,1998? 
3. What future medical care, if any, will be reasonably required for Owens as a result of 
his industrial injury of April 3,1998? 
4. What is the permanent partial impairment rating, if any, attributable to Owens 
cervical condition caused by his industrial accident of April 3, 1998? 
Dated on this 21st Day of November, 2002 
LABOR COMMISSION 
^Stuart L. Poelman 
Administrative Law Judge 
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Addendum C 
Order Denying Motion for Review 
Utah Labor Commissioner R. Lee Ellertson 
November 4,2003 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
DOUGLAS OWENS, 
Applicant, 
v. 
BECKSTROM BODY SHOP and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Defendants. 
Douglas Owens asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge 
Poelman's denial of Mr. Owens' claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the 
Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Mr. Owens seeks workers' compensation benefits from Beckstrom Body Shop and its 
insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to jointly as "Beckstrom" hereafter), for 
back injuries allegedly resulting from a work-related accident on April 3,1998. 
Judge Poelman held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Owens' claim, then referred the medical 
aspects of the claim to an impartial panel of medical experts. The panel concluded that Mr. Owens' 
back injuries were not caused by his accident at Beckstrom. Judge Poelman adopted the panel's 
opinion and denied Mr. Owens' claim for benefits. 
Mr. Owens now seeks Commission review of Judge Poelman's decision. Specifically, Mr. 
Owens argues the medical panel report, on which Judge Poelman's decision rests, is undermined by 
"factual errors (as) well as errors in medical interpretation." 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Neither Mr. Owens nor Beckstrom disagree with Judge Poelman's account of Mr. Owens' 
accident at Beckstrom and the events that followed the accident. The Commission adopts Judge 
Poelman's findings, which can be summarized as follows. 
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On April 3,1998, while working on an automotive repair project for Beckstrom, Mr. Owens 
used a pry bar to remove an axle nut. The axle nut snapped, and Mr. Owens felt a "pop"in his left 
wrist and a "shock" throughout his body. Several weeks later, in the course of another work-related 
project, Mr. Owens felt a sharp pain in his right elbow. In October 1998 and February 1999, Mr. 
Owens underwent "tennis elbow release surgery," first on his right arm and then on his left arm. 
Beckstrom accepted liability under the Workers' Compensation Act for Mr. Owens' bilateral arm 
injuries and paid the medical expenses and disability compensation attributable to those injuries. 
Mr. Owens left work for Beckstrom during November 1999. Over the next several years, he 
worked for a series of other employers. During December 1999 and January 2000, he twice fell 
down the stairs at his home. Each time, he complained of back pain and obtained medical attention. 
Thereafter, he continued to report back pain. On April 24, 2001, he underwent surgery on his 
cervical spine. 
The Commission now turns to the questions of medical fact that are at the heart of the dispute 
in this case. The Commission notes that Mr. Owens claims additional workers' compensation 
benefits under the theory that his accident at Beckstrom on April 3, 1998, caused cervical injuries 
that necessitated the surgery of April 24,2001. In support of his theory, Mr. Owens relies on the 
opinion of Dr. Welling, who performed the surgery. Dr. Welling states that Mr. Owens' cervical 
spine injury "was totally related to his work injury... of April 1998." The basis for Dr. Welling's 
opinion are : 1) the "long term edematous changes" to Mr. Owens' spinal cord shown on an MRI 
scan; 2) disc calcification observed during surgery; 3) Mr. Owens' "long standing paresthesias and 
weakness; and 4) the belief that cervical spine conditions of the type experienced by Mr. Owens are 
typically the result of trauma.1 
i 
In his motion for review, Mr. Owens also references Dr. Welling's letter of June 2, 2003, 
written five days after Judge Poelman issued his final decision in this matter. While Mr. 
Owens had every right to submit Dr. Welling's supplementary letter during the evidentiary 
hearing or during the 15-day period allowed by §34A-2-601(2)(d)(ii) for submission of 
objections to medical panel reports, Mr. Owens did not submit the letter until the evidentiary 
phase of this proceeding had been completed and the ALJ had issued his decision. 
Mr. Owens had reasonable opportunity to submit his evidence. To allow a party to submit 
untimely evidence, in this case or other cases, would subvert the orderliness of the 
adjudicative process and prejudice the rights of the other parties. The Commission therefore 
declines to accept or consider Dr. Welling's letter of June 2, 2003. 
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While Dr. Welling is of the opinion that Mr. Owens' accident at Beckstrom caused his spinal 
problems, Beckstrom has submitted a contrary opinion from its own medical consultant, Dr. Curtis, 
an orthopaedic specialist. Dr. Curtis has reviewed Mr. Owens' medical history in detail, including 
Dr. Welling's opinion that Mr. Owens' spinal injuries were caused by his work accident. However, 
Dr. Curtis concludes Mr. Owens' spinal injuries were not caused by the work accident. 
In light of the difference of medical opinion between Dr. Welling and Dr. Owens, Judge 
Poelman appointed an impartial panel of medical experts to consider the medical aspects of Mr. 
Owens' claim. The panel, consisting of a neurologist, an orthopedic surgeon and a psychiatrist, 
reviewed Mr. Owens' complete medical history, including diagnostic studies and the opinions of 
both Dr. Welling and Dr. Owens. The panel also personally examined Mr. Owens. Based on all this 
information, the panelists concluded that Mr. Owens' spinal injuries were not caused by his accident 
at Beckstrom. Specifically, the panel observed that spinal injuries of the type suffered by Mr. Owens 
are "almost never devoid of any pain at the time of impact" and "(t)here is an excessive long interval 
before any valid reports of the cervical symptoms occurred . . . . " 
In summary, the medical evidence now before the Commission includes Dr. Welling's 
opinion supporting Mr. Owens' claim, and the opinions of Dr. Curtis and the medical panel 
contradicting the claim. It is therefore necessary for the Commission to determine which of these 
opposing versions of medical fact is correct. 
Mr. Owens argues the medical panel opinion is incomplete and inaccurate. However, the 
"inaccuracies" identified by Mr. Owens are either inconsequential, matters of observation and 
judgment within the panel's expertise, or are simply not inaccuracies. Mr. Owens also challenges 
the medical panel's opinions with material extracted from the Internet. Without proper foundation, 
such material cannot be viewed as authoritative. 
Mr. Owens also argues that Dr. Welling's opinion is authoritative as to the cause of Mr. 
Owens' cervical problems. The Commission acknowledges that Dr. Welling, as Mr. Owens' 
surgeon, has direct knowledge regarding Mr. Owens' cervical condition. The Commission therefore 
places substantial weight on Dr. Welling's opinion. At the same time, the Commission finds no 
indication that Dr. Welling has reviewed Mr. Owens' complete medical history as that history is 
relevant to the development of his cervical condition. In contrast, the medical panel has reviewed 
Mr. Owens' entire medical record, and also has had the benefit of Dr. Welling's and Dr. Curtis's 
opinions. Furthermore, the panel had the advantage of collaboration among the medical experts that 
comprise the panel. Finally, the panel is not affiliated with either party to this dispute, but is an 
impartial adjunct to the Commission. 
After considering the foregoing factors, the Commission finds that the medical panel's 
opinion, buttressed by the similar opinion of Dr. Curtis, persuasively establishes that Mr. 
Beckstrom's cervical spine injuries were not medically caused by his work accident at Beckstrom 
on April 3, 1998. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides medical and disability benefits to workers 
injured by accident arising out of and in the course of their employment. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-
2-401. In order to establish that an injury "arises out o f employment, the injured worker must prove 
that a work-related activity or exertion is both the "legal cause" and the "medical cause" of the 
injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, the dispute between Mr. Owens and Beckstrom has centered on whether Mr. 
Owens' accident at Beckstrom on April 3,1998, medically caused his cervical spine injury. For the 
reasons explained in the preceding part of this decision, the Commission concludes that the accident 
did not medically cause the injury. Because Mr. Owens has failed to establish the element of 
medical causation, the Commission concludes that his injury did not arise out of his employment and 
is not compensable under the workers' compensation system. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge Poelman's decision and denies Mr. Owens' motion for 
review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this H day of November, 2003. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Douglas Owens, Case No. 02-0214, was mailed first class postage prepaid this _£__day of 
November, 2003, to the following: 
DOUGLAS OWENS 
3264 NORTH 750 EAST 
NORTH OGDENUT 84414 
BECKSTROM BODY SHOP 
1945 LINCOLN AVE 
OGDEN UT 84401 
LORI HANSEN, ATTORNEY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
MICHAEL GARY BELNAP, ATTORNEY 
2610 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDENUT 84401-3614 
Sara Danielson 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
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Addendum D 
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration 
Utah Labor Commissioner R. Lee Ellertson 
January 6, 2004 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
DOUGLAS OWENS, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
* 
* 
* 
it 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
BECKSTROM BODY SHOP and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 02-0214 
Douglas Owens asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision affirming 
Administrative Law Judge Poelman's denial of Mr. Owen's claim for benefits under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-13. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Mr. Owens reiterates his argument that his work at Beckstrom Body Shop was the medical 
cause of the injuries for which he now seeks workers' compensation benefits. 
DISCUSSION 
The arguments Mr. Owens raises in his request for reconsideration are similar to the 
arguments he originally made in his motion for review. After reviewing this matter again, the 
Commission concludes that Mr. Owens' arguments have been correctly addressed in the 
Commission's previous decision. 
ORDER 
The Commission reaffirms its previous Order in this matter and denies Mr. Owens' request 
for reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this ja day of January, 2004. 
L Lee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review 
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the matter 
of Douglas Owens, Case No. 2002214, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this j^_day of 
January, 2004, to the following: 
DOUGLAS OWENS 
3264 NORTH 750 EAST 
NORTH OGDENUT 84414 
BECKSTROM BODY SHOP 
1945 LINCOLN AVE 
OGDEN UT 84401 
LORI HANSEN, ATTORNEY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
MICHAEL GARY BELNAP, ATTORNEY 
2610 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDENUT 84401-3614 
Sara Danielson 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
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